Relativismo epistémico y circularidad

Piedrahita, Oscar A.

doi:10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.3

dc.contributor.author	Piedrahita, Oscar A.	spa
dc.date.accessioned	2020-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date.accessioned	2021-02-04T14:54:56Z
dc.date.available	2020-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date.available	2021-02-04T14:54:56Z
dc.date.issued	2020-01-01
dc.identifier.issn	0124-6127
dc.identifier.uri	https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.3
dc.identifier.uri	https://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/15462
dc.description.abstract	En este artículo, reviso el reciente intento de Steven Bland de refutar el relativismo epistémico por medio de un argumento dialéctico que prueba de manera no circular la confiabilidad objetiva de los sistemas epistémicos naturalistas. Antes de abordar el argumento de Bland, presento la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad y su relación con el relativismo epistémico. Concluyo argumentando que el intento de Bland de refutar el relativismo debe explicar cómo y por qué los compromisos con nuestros sistemas epistémicos deberían llevarnos a juzgar su confiabilidad.	spa
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, I review Steven Bland’s recent attempt to refute epistemic relativism by means of a dialectical argument that proves non-circularly the objective reliability of naturalistic epistemic systems. Before addressing Bland’s argument, I present the incommensurability thesis and its relation to epistemic relativism. I conclude by arguing that Bland’s attempt to refute relativism must explain how and why the commitments to our epistemic systems should lead us to judge their reliability.	eng
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	eng
dc.language.iso	eng	eng
dc.publisher	Universidad de Caldas	spa
dc.rights.uri	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/	eng
dc.source	https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/2531	eng
dc.subject	Relativism	eng
dc.subject	Circularity	eng
dc.subject	Incommensurability	eng
dc.subject	Justification	eng
dc.subject	relativismo	spa
dc.subject	circularidad	spa
dc.subject	inconmensurabilidad	spa
dc.subject	justificación	spa
dc.title	Relativismo epistémico y circularidad	spa
dc.type	Sección Artículos	spa
dc.type	Artículo de revista	spa
dc.type	Journal Article	eng
dc.identifier.doi	10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.3
dc.identifier.eissn	2462-9596
dc.relation.citationendpage	37
dc.relation.citationissue	36	spa
dc.relation.citationstartpage	25
dc.relation.citationvolume	21	spa
dc.relation.ispartofjournal	Discusiones Filosóficas	spa
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dc.rights.accessrights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	eng
dc.title.translated	Epistemic relativism and circularity	eng
dc.type.coar	http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501	eng
dc.type.content	Text	eng
dc.type.driver	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	eng
dc.type.version	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion	eng
dc.relation.citationedition	Núm. 36 , Año 2020 : Enero - Junio	spa
dc.relation.bitstream	https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/2531/2342
dc.type.coarversion	http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85	eng
dc.rights.coar	http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2	eng