dc.contributor.author | de Athayde Prata, Tárik | spa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-21 00:00:00 | |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-21 00:00:00 | |
dc.date.issued | 2012-12-21 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0124-6127 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/676 | |
dc.description.abstract | O artigo discute a controvérsia entre Jaegwon Kim (1934-) e John Searle (1932-) a respeito do modo como este  último utiliza o modelo ontológico estratificado em sua filosofia da mente. Após uma exposição e discussão  geral desse modelo (seção 2), são discutidas as respostas de Searle a duas das críticas de Kim ao naturalismo  biológico (seção 3). Apesar de usar o modelo estratificado e tentar construir um fisicalismo não redutivo, Searle  recai em um dualismo de propriedades (seção 4). | spa |
dc.description.abstract | This paper discusses the controversy between Jaegwon Kim (1934-) and John Searle (1932-) about the way the  latter uses the ontological layered model in his philosophy of mind. After an exposition and a general discussion of such model (section 2), Searle’s answers to some of Kim’s criticisms to biological naturalism are discussed  (section 3). Even though Searle uses a layered model and tries to construct a nonreductive physicalism, he ends  up recalling a property dualism. | eng |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | spa |
dc.language.iso | spa | spa |
dc.publisher | Universidad de Caldas | spa |
dc.rights | Derechos de autor 2012 Discusiones Filosóficas | spa |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | spa |
dc.source | https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/676 | spa |
dc.subject | Jaegwon Kim | eng |
dc.subject | John Searle | eng |
dc.subject | levels of complexity | eng |
dc.subject | ontology | eng |
dc.subject | mind-body problem | eng |
dc.subject | Jaegwon Kim | spa |
dc.subject | John Searle | spa |
dc.subject | níveis de complexidade | spa |
dc.subject | ontologia | spa |
dc.subject | problema mente-corpo | spa |
dc.title | O modelo ontológico estratificado no naturalismo biológico de John Searle: uma controvérsia com Jaegwon Kim. | spa |
dc.type | Artículo de revista | spa |
dc.type | Sección Artículos | spa |
dc.type | Journal Article | eng |
dc.identifier.eissn | 2462-9596 | |
dc.relation.citationendpage | 137 | |
dc.relation.citationissue | 21 | spa |
dc.relation.citationstartpage | 119 | |
dc.relation.citationvolume | 13 | spa |
dc.relation.ispartofjournal | Discusiones Filosóficas | spa |
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dc.rights.accessrights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | spa |
dc.title.translated | Ontological model stratified in the naturalism biological of John Searle: a dispute with Jaegwon Kim | eng |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | spa |
dc.type.content | Text | spa |
dc.type.driver | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | spa |
dc.type.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | spa |
dc.relation.citationedition | Núm. 21 , Año 2012 : Julio - Diciembre | spa |
dc.relation.bitstream | https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/676/599 | |
dc.type.coarversion | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | spa |
dc.rights.coar | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | spa |