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dc.contributor.authorde Athayde Prata, Tárikspa
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-21 00:00:00
dc.date.available2012-12-21 00:00:00
dc.date.issued2012-12-21
dc.identifier.issn0124-6127
dc.identifier.urihttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/676
dc.description.abstractO artigo discute a controvérsia entre Jaegwon Kim (1934-) e John Searle (1932-) a respeito do modo como este  último utiliza o modelo ontológico estratificado em sua filosofia da mente. Após uma exposição e discussão  geral desse modelo (seção 2), são discutidas as respostas de Searle a duas das críticas de Kim ao naturalismo  biológico (seção 3). Apesar de usar o modelo estratificado e tentar construir um fisicalismo não redutivo, Searle  recai em um dualismo de propriedades (seção 4).spa
dc.description.abstractThis paper discusses the controversy between Jaegwon Kim (1934-) and John Searle (1932-) about the way the  latter uses the ontological layered model in his philosophy of mind. After an exposition and a general discussion of such model (section 2), Searle’s answers to some of Kim’s criticisms to biological naturalism are discussed  (section 3). Even though Searle uses a layered model and tries to construct a nonreductive physicalism, he ends  up recalling a property dualism.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisherUniversidad de Caldasspa
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2012 Discusiones Filosóficasspa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/spa
dc.sourcehttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/676spa
dc.subjectJaegwon Kimeng
dc.subjectJohn Searleeng
dc.subjectlevels of complexityeng
dc.subjectontologyeng
dc.subjectmind-body problemeng
dc.subjectJaegwon Kimspa
dc.subjectJohn Searlespa
dc.subjectníveis de complexidadespa
dc.subjectontologiaspa
dc.subjectproblema mente-corpospa
dc.titleO modelo ontológico estratificado no naturalismo biológico de John Searle: uma controvérsia com Jaegwon Kim.spa
dc.typeArtículo de revistaspa
dc.typeSección Artículosspa
dc.typeJournal Articleeng
dc.identifier.eissn2462-9596
dc.relation.citationendpage137
dc.relation.citationissue21spa
dc.relation.citationstartpage119
dc.relation.citationvolume13spa
dc.relation.ispartofjournalDiscusiones Filosóficasspa
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dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
dc.title.translatedOntological model stratified in the naturalism biological of John Searle: a dispute with Jaegwon Kimeng
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dc.relation.citationeditionNúm. 21 , Año 2012 : Julio - Diciembrespa
dc.relation.bitstreamhttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/676/599
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