dc.contributor.author | García Duque, Carlos Emilio | spa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-07-01 00:00:00 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-12-09T16:56:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-07-01 00:00:00 | |
dc.date.available | 2020-12-09T16:56:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-07-01 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0124-6127 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2019.20.35.3 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/14787 | |
dc.description.abstract | En este artículo intentaré ofrecer una caracterización del concepto de ‘racionalidad’ en el ámbito práctico de Smith. Me propongo mostrar que los requisitos de racionalidad que él establece (en tanto se basan en Williams) no logran proporcionar una explicación apropiada y funcional de lo que significa ser un agente completamente racional. Para este fin, examinaré el requisito internalista de la razón en Williams y discutiré los principales defectos de esa versión de racionalidad. También trataré de mostrar que los planteamientos sobre la racionalidad de Smith y los de Williams son demasiado restrictivos y que, en consecuencia, no se pueden aplicar al caso de agentes ordinarios que deliberan en la vida real. | spa |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, I shall attempt a characterization of Smith’s concept of ‘rationality’ in the practical sphere. My goal is to show that Smith’s requirements of rationality (as inspired by Williams) cannot provide a good and workable account of what it means to be a fully rational agent. To this end, I shall examine Williams’ internalist requirement on reason and discuss the main shortcomings of such account of rationality. I shall try to show, also, that Smith’s and Williams’ views on rationality are too restrictive and thus cannot be applied to ordinary agents who deliberate in real life. | eng |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | eng |
dc.language.iso | eng | eng |
dc.publisher | Universidad de Caldas | spa |
dc.rights | Derechos de autor 2019 Carlos Emilio García Duque | eng |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 | eng |
dc.source | https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/310 | eng |
dc.subject | the internalist requirement on reasons | eng |
dc.subject | rationality | eng |
dc.subject | practical sphere | eng |
dc.subject | fully rational agent | eng |
dc.subject | less than fully rational agent | eng |
dc.subject | Smith | eng |
dc.subject | Williams | eng |
dc.subject | el requisito internalista de las razones | spa |
dc.subject | racionalidad | spa |
dc.subject | ámbito de la práctica | spa |
dc.subject | agente completamente racional | spa |
dc.subject | agente no completamente racional | spa |
dc.subject | Smith | spa |
dc.subject | Williams | spa |
dc.title | El concepto de "racionalidad" en el ámbito práctico. | spa |
dc.type | Sección Artículos | spa |
dc.type | Artículo de revista | spa |
dc.type | Journal Article | eng |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.17151/difil.2019.20.35.3 | |
dc.identifier.eissn | 2462-9596 | |
dc.relation.citationendpage | 43 | |
dc.relation.citationissue | 35 | spa |
dc.relation.citationstartpage | 31 | |
dc.relation.citationvolume | 20 | spa |
dc.relation.ispartofjournal | Discusiones Filosóficas | spa |
dc.relation.references | Alvarez, Maria. Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality. Synthese, 2018: 195, pp. 3293–3310 | eng |
dc.relation.references | Audi, Robert. The Practical Authority of Normative Beliefs: Toward an Integrated Theory of Practical Rationality. Organon, 2013: F 20 (4), pp. 527-545 | eng |
dc.relation.references | Audi, Robert. Reasons, Practical Reason, and Practical Reasoning. Ratio (new series) 2004: XVII, 2, pp. 119-149 | eng |
dc.relation.references | Garcia, C. E. Popper. El conocimiento objetivo y el mundo tres. Manizales: Universidad de Caldas, 2019. | eng |
dc.relation.references | Garcia, C. E. Popper’s theory of science. An apologia. London: Continuum, 2006. | eng |
dc.relation.references | Gao, Jie. Rational action without knowledge (and vice versa). Synthese, 2017: 194:1901–1917 | eng |
dc.relation.references | Logins, Arturs. The problem of massive deception for justification norms of action. Acta Analytica, 2014: 220, 1, pp. 1-20 | eng |
dc.relation.references | Schroeder, Timothy. Practical rationality is a problem in the philosophy of mind. Philosophical Issues, 20, Philosophy of Mind, 2010: pp. 394-409 | eng |
dc.relation.references | Sinhababu, Neil. The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 2011: 6,1, pp. 1-13 | eng |
dc.relation.references | Smith, Michael. Internal Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 1995: LV, No. 1. | eng |
dc.relation.references | Velleman, J. David. The possibility of Practical Reason. Ethics, 1996: 106, No. 4, pp. 694-726. | eng |
dc.relation.references | Watson, Gary. “Free Agency”. (1975) Reprinted in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will. Oxford University Press. 1982 | eng |
dc.relation.references | Williams, Bernard. “Internal and external reasons.” In: Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. p. 101-113 10 | eng |
dc.rights.accessrights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | eng |
dc.rights.creativecommons | Esta obra está bajo licencia internacional Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0. | eng |
dc.title.translated | The concept of "rationality" in the practical sphere. | eng |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | eng |
dc.type.content | Text | eng |
dc.type.driver | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | eng |
dc.type.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | eng |
dc.relation.citationedition | Núm. 35 , Año 2019 : Julio - Diciembre | spa |
dc.relation.bitstream | https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/310/245 | |
dc.type.coarversion | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | eng |
dc.rights.coar | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | eng |