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dc.contributor.authorMiranda Rojas, Rafaelspa
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-04T14:54:57Z
dc.date.available2020-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date.available2021-02-04T14:54:57Z
dc.date.issued2020-01-01
dc.identifier.issn0124-6127
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.5
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/15464
dc.description.abstractEl presente escrito propone que lo necesario a posteriori corresponde a un caso híbrido de justificación, sin que ello conduzca a un compromiso racionalista extremo. En los casos de enunciados necesarios a posteriori, los principios lógicos que instancian son de carácter a priori, y la información de enunciados como “Agua es H2 O” o “El dolor es la estimulación de la fibra – c” son cognoscibles solo a posteriori. Para explicar esta hibridez, se discutirá cómo la estrategia vía reductio permite aceptar una aproximación racionalista moderada. Se considerará el bootstrapping como caso paradigmático de justificación epistémica híbrida. La discusión respecto al nexo a priori – a posteriori tiende a establecer una jerarquía, en la que uno de los accesos epistémicos es privilegiado, lo que se rechazará.spa
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes that what is necessary a posteriori corresponds to a hybrid case of justification, without this leading to an extreme rationalist commitment. In the cases of necessary a posteriori statements, the logical principles that they instantiate are of a priori nature, and the information of statements such as "Water is H2 O" or "Pain is the stimulation of the fiber - c" are knowable only a posteriori. In order to explain this hybridity, how the reductio strategy allows accepting a moderate rationalist approach will be discussed. Bootstrapping will be considered as a paradigmatic case of hybrid epistemic justification. The discussion regarding the a priori - a posteriori nexus tends to establish a hierarchy in which one of the epistemic accesses is privileged, whichwill be rejected.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisherUniversidad de Caldasspa
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2020 Discusiones Filosóficasspa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/spa
dc.sourcehttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/2534spa
dc.subjectNecessityeng
dc.subjecta posteriorieng
dc.subjecta priorieng
dc.subjectconceivableeng
dc.subjectpossibleeng
dc.subjectNecesidadspa
dc.subjecta posteriorispa
dc.subjecta priorispa
dc.subjectconcebiblespa
dc.subjectposiblespa
dc.titleLa hibridez de lo necesario a posteriorispa
dc.typeSección Artículosspa
dc.typeArtículo de revistaspa
dc.typeJournal Articleeng
dc.identifier.doi10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.5
dc.identifier.eissn2462-9596
dc.relation.citationendpage78
dc.relation.citationissue36spa
dc.relation.citationstartpage53
dc.relation.citationvolume21spa
dc.relation.ispartofjournalDiscusiones Filosóficasspa
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dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
dc.title.translatedThe hybridity of what is necessary a posteriorieng
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501spa
dc.type.contentTextspa
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlespa
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionspa
dc.relation.citationeditionNúm. 36 , Año 2020 : Enero - Juniospa
dc.relation.bitstreamhttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/2534/2344
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85spa
dc.rights.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2spa


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