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Teoría de las virtudes: Un nuevo enfoque de la epistemología (parte ii). Desafíos externos y lucha interna

dc.contributor.authorHoyos Valdes, Dianaspa
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-22 00:00:00
dc.date.available2006-12-22 00:00:00
dc.date.issued2006-12-22
dc.identifier.issn0124-6127
dc.identifier.urihttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/580
dc.description.abstractEl artículo muestra la forma en que la epistemología de las virtudes  puede resolver algunos de los problemas epistemológicos clásicos, y la manera en que puede lograrse una concepción integrada de las  variantes confiabilista y responsabilista de la epistemología de las virtudes.spa
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows the way in which Virtue Epistemology can solve some of the classical epistemological problems, and the way in which an integrated approach of the Reliabilist and Responsibilist variants of Virtue Epistemology can be achieved.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisherUniversidad de Caldasspa
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2006 Discusiones Filosóficasspa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/spa
dc.sourcehttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/580spa
dc.subjectVirtue Epistemologyeng
dc.subjectGettier Counterexampleseng
dc.subjectEpistemic Luckeng
dc.subjectSkepticismeng
dc.subjectEpistemic Goodseng
dc.subjectReliabilismeng
dc.subjectResponsibilismeng
dc.subjectSosaeng
dc.subjectZagzebskieng
dc.subjectGrecoeng
dc.subjectEpistemología de las Virtudesspa
dc.subjectcasos Gettierspa
dc.subjectfortuna epistémicaspa
dc.subjectescepticismospa
dc.subjectbienes epistémicosspa
dc.subjectConfiabilismospa
dc.subjectResponsabilismospa
dc.subjectSosaspa
dc.subjectZagzebskispa
dc.subjectGrecospa
dc.titleTeoría de las virtudes: Un nuevo enfoque de la epistemología (parte ii). Desafíos externos y lucha internaspa
dc.typeArtículo de revistaspa
dc.typeSección Artículosspa
dc.typeJournal Articleeng
dc.identifier.eissn2462-9596
dc.relation.citationendpage113
dc.relation.citationissue10spa
dc.relation.citationstartpage89
dc.relation.citationvolume7spa
dc.relation.ispartofjournalDiscusiones Filosóficasspa
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dc.relation.citationeditionNúm. 10 , Año 2006 : Enero - Diciembrespa
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